Studies of electoral disproportionality and bias under Australia's alternative electoral system have mainly relied on the two-party preferred (2PP) vote totals for all electorates, irrespective of whether these are needed to determine the election outcome there. We argue that separate analyses should be undertaken for two groups of electorates -where the determination is made using the first-preference (FP) votes and where the 2PP redistributed votes are needed because no candidate wins a majority of FP votes, illustrating this with an analysis of the 2007 House of Representatives election results.
Introduction
The Alternative Vote (AV) system used for elections to the Australian House of Representatives poses particular problems for analyses of electoral disproportionality and bias. Most analysts have used data on the two-party preferred (2PP) vote totals in each electorate (i.e. after preferences have been distributed) as their measure of party strength. This almost entirely eliminates candidates of small 'minor parties' and presents a false impression of the strengths of the two main party blocks. It also misrepresents the situation in well over half of the electorates at some recent contests where the outcome is determined on the first preference (FP) votes. We argue that disproportionality and bias in the two groups of electorates should be analysed separately, illustrating this using the 2007 House of Representatives' election.
In evaluating the seats:votes relationship, analysts of AV contests can use either FP votes or 2PP votes after the reallocation of preferences; since 1983 the 2PP vote has been determined for every electorate, irrespective of whether the result was determined at the FP stage. Standard practice has been to use the 2PP totals. In his detailed analyses of Australian electoral biases, for example, Jackman (1994, 323) claimed that '[t] he number of first preference votes a party receives is often a misleading indicator . . . [of a party's electoral strength], since seats are decided after distributing preferences'. However, his contention that '2PP provides convenient summaries of the electoral strengths of the main partisan groupings' (Jackman 1994, 324) had already been countered by Rydon (1986) , who argued that 'publication of the full distribution of the preferences . . . may have served a useful purpose in underlining the limited usefulness of 'two-party preferred' because 'there is no one simple method of handling election results. Methods must be devised to meet different purposes and in the light of electoral competition'. This paper follows Rydon's argument.
An additional complication in the Australian context is the nature of the party system. The most commonly used bias measures are best suited to situations in which two parties predominate (Borisyuk et al. 2008) . Australia has a variant of that situation: the left-of-centre has a single dominant partythe Australian Labor Party (ALP) -but the centre-right has two -Liberal and National. The latter have long operated as a Liberal-National Coalition (LNC), 1 but in some electorates, where a retiring member from one of the parties is not seeking re-election, each may field a candidate, potentially splitting the centre-right vote. Such situations have been relatively rare recently (in 2007 only eight electorates had both Liberal and National candidates), but they need to be incorporated into analyses of disproportionality and bias.
Evaluating Election Outcomes Under the Alternative Vote
The core of the problem of evaluating disproportionality and bias in Australian House of Representatives election results is illustrated in Table 1 . The first block gives each party's 2007 percentages of all FP and 2PP votes cast, and seats won. (All 'Other' parties are combined.) If FP votes are the standard against which seat allocation is contrasted, the Liberal Party achieved almost proportional representation, National was somewhat over-represented, the ALP substantially over-represented, and the other parties very substantially under-represented. If 2PP votes are the comparator, the LNC is slightly underrepresented and the ALP slightly over-represented (seat:votes ratios of 0.93 and 1.06, respectively) and the 'Others' proportionally represented. If we follow Jackman and others in preferring the 2PP standard, the result was fairly proportional.
Using the 2PP votes also misrepresents 'Other' parties whose candidates were eliminated in all but three electorates used in the final determination. Moreover, 1 In 2008, the two parties merged in the State of Queensland, a decision that may stimulate similar mergers in other States and nationally. using either the FP or 2PP vote counts for all electorates confounds the situation, as illustrated by the lower two blocks which separate the 75 electorates determined on FP votes from the other 75 for which 2PP totals were the determinant. In the former, all three 'main' parties, but especially the ALP, were over-represented and the 'Others' massively under-represented. Conversely, in the 75 seats won on the 2PP votes, the levels of over-and underrepresentation were much smaller. The outcome shown in the first block is thus a net effect that confounds two very different sets of outcomes.
Use of the AV system, with seats decided by either FP or 2PP votes -together with the small number of seats for which both Liberals and Nationals field candidates -produces at least six analytical scenarios ( Table 2 ). The first, analysing 2PP votes across all electorates, ignores 'Other' parties. The next two are also unsuitable, because the result is determined in many electorates only after distribution of the 2PP votes. The fourth option is also flawed -combining the votes for the two LNC parties could see them 'winning' a seat on the FP votes which neither could on its own.
The fifth analyses the situation in electorates where the result is determined on FP votes only, and the two coalition parties are treated separately but where the coalition partner with the largest FP total is treated as the LNC's main party. The sixth analyses only those electorates in which 2PP votes are used for the final determination (which in all but two cases involved both ALP and LNC candidates). These two separate sets of results are, in effect, the 'real' situation.
Clear differences across these six scenarios are shown by the Gallagher (1991) least-squares disproportionality index values (D) ( Table 3) . Those based on 2PP vote shares -options 1 and 6 -are, on average, only about one-third of those based on FP vote shares; when all parties are included, disproportionality is much greater than when only the final two parties (ALP and the LNC in all but three electorates) are deployed. In our preferred scenarios, 5 and 6, disproportionality was much greater in the 75 electorates where the result was determined using FP votes (scenario 5) than in the other 75 where 2PP totals were deployed (scenario 6).
Measuring Bias
A growing literature explores the degree of bias -or partisan asymmetry (Grofman and King 2007) -in election results. Whereas studies of disproportionality focus on deviation from a proportional representation norm, those of bias are concerned with whether such disproportionality affects all parties equally. Some attempts to evaluate bias use the actual election result (Grofman, Brunell and Campagna 1997; Blau 2001) ; others create a notional election result, based on the actual outcome but changing the relative performance of the two main parties to estimate the result if the votes cast had been distributed differently across the parties, but in the same relative proportion in every electorate. We use the latter approach. The procedure developed by Brookes (1959; 1960) takes the election result and, using a uniform swing, reallocates votes from one party to another in every electorate to produce a notional election outcome. A wide range of swings can be evaluated (Johnston, Rossiter, Pattie and Dorling 2002) ; we concentrate on one -equal vote shares. The procedure establishes how many seats each party For bias and efficiency a positive figure indicates pro-LNC bias, whereas a negative figure indicates pro-ALP bias.
would obtain in a notional election where both have the same percentage votes share (i.e. each winning half of the national total). Bias is presented as the difference between their two seat totals -with the implicit assumption that with equal vote shares in an unbiased situation they should get equal seat allocations. Brookes' procedure decomposes the estimated bias into various generating factors, of which the most important are differences between electorates in their number of electors and proportion of abstentions, and inter-party differences in the efficiency of their vote distributions. In Australia, compulsory voting renders the abstentions component redundant and frequent redistricting to achieve electoral equality means that malapportionment is largely irrelevant (Medew 2008) . This leaves the efficiency component as the likely bias generator. It is generally interpreted as a function of the proportion of a party's votes that is effective (i.e. win it seats). The larger the proportion that is either 'wasted' (i.e. cast in electorates in which it loses) or 'surplus' (i.e. cast in electorates it wins by large majorities), then the smaller the proportion that is effective. Bias favours the party with the largest effective vote share (Johnston et al. 2001; 2006) . Table 3 shows the estimated bias at Australia's 2007 election for each of the six scenarios in Table 2 -a positive figure indicates bias favouring the LNC, whereas a negative figure indicates pro-ALP bias. Also indicated is the size of the efficiency component. (The other components, as anticipated, are close to zero and so omitted. If the efficiency component is larger than the total bias figure, one or more of the other components indicates bias in the opposite direction.) Following Jackman, the first scenario indicates a pro-LNC bias; if the two main blocks had equal shares of the 2PP votes, the LNC would have had a majority in the House. The second and third scenarios -using the FP votes in all electorates -suggest a similar outcome. The ALP won the election, in both votes and seats, but may not have done so if the contest had been somewhat closer because its votes were apparently less efficiently distributed across all electorates than that of the LNC's.
Bias in Australia's House of Representatives Elections
We argue that this is a misleading conclusion, however, contending that the fifth and sixth scenarios provide the most realistic approach to bias estimation. These indicate an intriguing outcome. In the 75 electorates in which the result was determined on the FP votes, there was a pro-ALP bias of eight seats, whereas in the other 75, where 2PP votes determined the outcome, a similar bias favoured the LNC. In both cases the efficiency component predominated.
This last finding suggests that the geography of support for the two voting blocs differentially favoured them in the parts of the country where they prevailed. Table 4 categorises electorates by the stage at which the result was determined, which party would have won them in a notional election with equal vote shares, and the estimated margin of victory then. The first two columns show a clear difference in the 75 seats determined by FP votes (one of which was won by an 'Other' party). Almost all with the LNC as victor would have been won by very large margins -meaning it gleaned many surplus votes but there were relatively few wasted votes for ALP -whereas many where the ALP candidate was the estimated winner had smaller majorities: the ALP had a more efficient vote distribution, hence a pro-ALP bias there. In the 74 electorates won by one of the blocks at the 2PP determination, on the other hand, there were not only many more marginal seats (suggesting that the distribution of preferences tends to 'close the gap' between the two) but that the LNC would have won many more highly marginal contests than the ALP -hence a pro-LNC bias there.
To provide a longer-term perspective, similar analyses have been undertaken for the previous five elections (Table 5 ). The ALP won a legislative majority in 1993 and 2007, with the LNC victorious in the other four. In 1998, however, the LNC victory was based on a tie in the percentage of FP votes and an ALP plurality on 2PP votes. (In the 50 seats won on FP votes, ALP got 46% of those *A positive figure indicates pro-LNC bias, whereas a negative figure represents pro-ALP bias. votes, compared to 36% for the LNC parties, the ALP winning 32 of the seats and the LNC only 18. In the 98 districts won according to the 2PP votes, the shares of the votes were ALP 47% and LNC 51%; the seats were allocated 34 : 63, respectively.) The bias estimates vary considerably, not only across elections but also according to the scenario employed. Focusing on the fifth and sixth scenarios, these show that -with the exception of 1998 -the party that won the election overall experienced a bias in its favour in the electorates in which the determination was at the FP stage (scenario 5). The LNC achieved a very substantial bias in its favour at three such contests, averaging 30 seats (out of totals ranging from 62 to 87), whereas the ALP's two victories in 1993 and 2007 generated much smaller biases (72 and 78 , respectively). At the 2PP determination, under scenario 6, those two ALP victories overall were achieved despite substantial biases favouring the LNC, whereas the four LNC victories were associated with minimal bias at that stage of the translation of votes into seats.
The 1998 election appears to be an anomaly, with a pro-ALP bias according to scenario 5. The ALP and LNC were tied in their vote share in the relatively small number of electorates determined by FP votes, and this was insufficient to counter the lack of any bias to either bloc in the electorates determined at the 2PP stage. The LNC won the election because the ALP's advantage in the small number of FP-determined districts was insufficient to deliver it enough seats for victory overall, especially as there was no bias in the twothirds of the electorates in which the result was determined according to the 2PP votes. (For further details on those earlier elections, see Johnston and Forrest 2009.) A general trend thus emerges. Across the electorates, the relatively marginal seats tend to swing between the two main party blocs. When a party wins the election outright, this usually involves winning almost all of those marginal districts that are determined by FP votes, benefiting that party in the bias calculations. There is much less bias in districts determined by the 2PP votes, however, largely because -as the detailed analyses of 2007 suggest -neither party had a substantial advantage by winning most of the (larger number of) marginal districts. The degree to which a party benefits from the efficiency of its voter distribution is therefore a function of two factors: its margin of victory in the FP-determined districts and the proportion of the electorates with the result being determined at that stage. Hence, the 1998 outcome -in a very tight contest, the ALP benefited from a substantial bias in the FP-determined seats where it tied with the LNC, but these formed only a relatively small proportion of all districts and could not counter the LNC's victory in the large number of districts in which the 2PP votes were deployed.
Conclusions
We have argued against the conventional wisdom that disproportionality and bias in Australian election results should be studied using only 2PP vote totals. A substantial number of electorate results at recent House of Representatives' contests are determined according to FP votes, with one candidate gaining an outright majority. Hence, we have analysed the 2007 results using FP votes for ELECTORAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND BIAS UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE 527 those electorates in which the result was determined without the distribution of preferences, and 2PP votes for the remainder.
This analysis identified a substantial pro-ALP bias in the FP group of 75 electorates. Its votes were more efficiently distributed there because many of the electorates it won were more marginal than those won by the largest party in the LNC coalition. In contrast, there was a pro-LNC bias in the 75 electorates for which the 2PP votes were used to determine the outcome because the LNC won more marginal contests at that stage than the ALP. Extending the analysis to the five preceding elections showed that the party that won most votes in electorates determined at the FP stage benefited from bias generated by the efficiency of the vote distribution -substantially so in the case of the LNC at three of those contests.
Treating all electorates as if they were won at the 2PP stage thus produces a misleading indication of the extent and direction of disproportionality and bias in Australian House of Representatives' election results. The procedure adopted here provides a much more realistic indication of those features, and throws considerable light on how the AV system operates.
